[redacted for anonymous review] I show that Lewis’s account of intrinsic properties faces a puzzle when it comes to classifying quantum spin.
[redacted for anonymous review] I propose a set-theoretic analysis of the notion of a mechanism, biological or otherwise.
[redacted for anonymous review] I argue against the dominant, set-theoretic approach to analyzing the structures of mathematical objects (like spacetime theories), and I suggest a more group-theoretic alternative.
“Typical”. I explore and defend a philosophical account of typicality and typicality explanations.
“Boundary Constraints and the Interventionist Account of Explanation”. I show that Woodward and Hitchcock’s account of explanation has trouble with certain cases, and I suggest a revised version of their account that does not.
“Lawhood and Calculational Tractability”. I argue for an amended version of the ‘Best System’ account of laws, according to which laws must be tractable as well as simple and informative.
“The Physical Content of Mathematical Expressions”. I propose a few general principles by which to infer some of the physical content of our physical theories from the mathematics in which they are couched.
“Chaos Regained: On the Possibility of a New Era in Orbital Dynamics”. I explore the way evidence in orbital dynamics has changed in the last century, first with the discovery of mathematical chaos and then with the development of spacecraft that can follow chaotic trajectories.