Isaac Wilhelm

isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu

Publications (academic)

- The Counteridentical Account of Explanatory Identities (forthcoming).
*The Journal of Philosophy*. - I propose a theory of how identity facts explain by using (i) explanatory counterfactuals, (ii) counterpart theory, (iii) impossible worlds, and (iv) structural equation models.
- Intrinsicality and Entanglement (forthcoming).
*Mind*. - I show that when applied to entangled quantum systems, Langton and Lewis's analysis of intrinsicality faces a puzzle.
- Centering the Principal Principle (forthcoming).
*Philosophical Studies*. - I show that centered propositions pose a serious problem for Lewis's Principal Principle, and I solve the problem by proposing that centered propositions can be objectively chancy.
- Comparing Mathematical Explanations (forthcoming).
*The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. - I develop an account of how to compare the explanatory capacities of mathematical proofs.
- Grounding and Propositional Identity (forthcoming).
*Analysis*. - I show that standard conditions for immediate partial ground contradict standard conditions for the identities of propositions.
- Explanatory Priority Monism (forthcoming).
*Philosophical Studies*. - I argue that a single relation (i) backs all cases of explanation, and (ii) explains why other relations—causation, grounding, and so on—are explanation-backing.
- Typical: A Theory of Typicality and Typicality Explanation (forthcoming).
*The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*(archive version). - I argue that facts about what is typical—for instance, the fact that gases typically evolve to equilibrium—can explain.
- Featured in the OUP "Best of Philosophy 2019" article collection.
- The Logic of Typicality (forthcoming). In Valia Allori, ed.,
*Statistical Mechanics and Scientific Explanation: Determinism, Indeterminism and Laws of Nature*. World Scientific (with Harry Crane). - I propose a formal system, based on propositional modal logic, for reasoning about typicality.
- A Statistical Analysis of Luck (2020).
*Synthese*197: 867-885. - I analyze luck using the Mentaculus, a statistical mechanical theory of probability.
- An Argument for Entity Grounding (2020).
*Analysis*80: 500-507. - I argue for the view that non-facts—as well as facts—can ground.
- Interventionist Explanation and the Problem of Single Variable Boundary Constraints (2020).
*Noûs*54: 945-955. - I use laws featuring just one variable to raise a problem—and suggest a solution—for interventionist accounts of explanation.
- The Stage Theory of Groups (2020).
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*98: 661-674. - I propose an account of groups: roughly, groups are fusions of pluralities at worlds and times.
- Celestial Chaos: The New Logics of Theory-Testing in Orbital Dynamics (2019).
*Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics*65: 97-102. - I argue that a new research methodology, currently emerging in the fields of astronomy and spacecraft trajectory design, solves several epistemological problems posed by chaotic dynamics in the solar system.
- The Ontology of Mechanisms (2019).
*The Journal of Philosophy*116: 615-636. - I use causation to formulate existence conditions, identity conditions, and parthood conditions for mechanisms.
- New Data on the Representation of Women in Philosophy Journals: 2004-2015 (2018).
*Philosophical Studies*175: 1441-1464 (with Sherri Conklin and Nicole Hassoun). - We present and analyze data on the percentage of women authors of articles in 25 top philosophy journals.
- The Representation of Belief (2018).
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*47: 715-732. - I prove that if an agent's set of beliefs satisfies Scott's axiom, then that set of beliefs can be formally represented by a probability function.

Works in Progress or Under Review

- [redacted for anonymous review] I propose a stage-theoretic, fine-grained theory of properties, relations, and propositions which avoids the Russell-Myhill argument.
- [redacted for anonymous review] I argue that some individuals have their genders essentially while others do not.
- [redacted for anonymous review] I explore three principles for extracting physical content from the mathematical expressions in which physical theories are couched.
- [redacted for anonymous review] I use centered changes—chances, that is, of centered propositions—to formulate an account of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics.
- [redacted for anonymous review] I derive a complete theory of propositional identity from a few plausible principles of grounding.
- [redacted for anonymous review] I argue that for the purposes of metaphysical theorizing, the calculus of constructions—a higher-order language which allows for quantification over types—is better than other languages discussed by philosophers.
- [redacted for anonymous review] I analyze causation in terms of explanation.
- [redacted for anonymous review] I explore several theories of the objective value of naturalness.