Isaac Wilhelm

isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu

Publications (academic)

The Counteridentical Account of Explanatory Identities (forthcoming). The Journal of Philosophy.

I propose a theory of how identity facts explain by using (i) explanatory counterfactuals, (ii) counterpart theory, (iii) impossible worlds, and (iv) structural equation models.

I show that when applied to entangled quantum systems, Langton and Lewis's analysis of intrinsicality faces a puzzle.

I show that centered propositions pose a serious problem for Lewis's Principal Principle, and I solve the problem by proposing that centered propositions can be objectively chancy.

Comparing Mathematical Explanations (forthcoming). The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

I develop an account of how to compare the explanatory capacities of mathematical proofs.

I show that standard conditions for immediate partial ground contradict standard conditions for the identities of propositions.

I argue that a single relation (i) backs all cases of explanation, and (ii) explains why other relations—causation, grounding, and so on—are explanation-backing.

Typical: A Theory of Typicality and Typicality Explanation (forthcoming). The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (archive version).

I argue that facts about what is typical—for instance, the fact that gases typically evolve to equilibrium—can explain.
Featured in the OUP "Best of Philosophy 2019" article collection.

The Logic of Typicality (forthcoming). In Valia Allori, ed., Statistical Mechanics and Scientific Explanation: Determinism, Indeterminism and Laws of Nature. World Scientific (with Harry Crane).

I propose a formal system, based on propositional modal logic, for reasoning about typicality.

I analyze luck using the Mentaculus, a statistical mechanical theory of probability.

Interventionist Explanation and the Problem of Single Variable Boundary Constraints (2020). Noûs 54: 945-955.

I use laws featuring just one variable to raise a problem—and suggest a solution—for interventionist accounts of explanation.

The Stage Theory of Groups (2020). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98: 661-674.

I propose an account of groups: roughly, groups are fusions of pluralities at worlds and times.

Celestial Chaos: The New Logics of Theory-Testing in Orbital Dynamics (2019). Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 65: 97-102.

I argue that a new research methodology, currently emerging in the fields of astronomy and spacecraft trajectory design, solves several epistemological problems posed by chaotic dynamics in the solar system.

I use causation to formulate existence conditions, identity conditions, and parthood conditions for mechanisms.

New Data on the Representation of Women in Philosophy Journals: 2004-2015 (2018). Philosophical Studies 175: 1441-1464 (with Sherri Conklin and Nicole Hassoun).

We present and analyze data on the percentage of women authors of articles in 25 top philosophy journals.

The Representation of Belief (2018). Journal of Philosophical Logic 47: 715-732.

I prove that if an agent's set of beliefs satisfies Scott's axiom, then that set of beliefs can be formally represented by a probability function.

Works in Progress or Under Review

[redacted for anonymous review] I propose a stage-theoretic, fine-grained theory of properties, relations, and propositions which avoids the Russell-Myhill argument.
[redacted for anonymous review] I argue that some individuals have their genders essentially while others do not.
[redacted for anonymous review] I explore three principles for extracting physical content from the mathematical expressions in which physical theories are couched.
[redacted for anonymous review] I use centered changes—chances, that is, of centered propositions—to formulate an account of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics.
[redacted for anonymous review] I derive a complete theory of propositional identity from a few plausible principles of grounding.
[redacted for anonymous review] I argue that for the purposes of metaphysical theorizing, the calculus of constructions—a higher-order language which allows for quantification over types—is better than other languages discussed by philosophers.
[redacted for anonymous review] I analyze causation in terms of explanation.
[redacted for anonymous review] I explore several theories of the objective value of naturalness.