- Logic for Justice (forthcoming). Routledge.
- Covers the basics of propositional logic, and first-order logic, while explaining their relevance to social justice and political reform.
- This textbook frames propositional logic and first-order logic as two reasonable answers to the question "What makes some arguments good and other arguments bad?" That question is extremely relevant to social and political reform. To bring about justice and change, it is important that we be able to evaluate and criticize the arguments given by politicians, lawyers, lobbyists, CEOs, billionaires, journalists, media personalities, religious leaders, and so on. Propositional logic, and first-order logic, can help with that.
- The Typical Principle (forthcoming). The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Worlds are Pluralities (forthcoming). Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
- I propose a principle of rationality—believe propositions that, given your evidence, are typically true—which is arguably more basic than the Principal Principle.
Comparing Mathematical Explanations (forthcoming). The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
- I argue that possible worlds are pluralities of sentences in an extremely large language, and I raise a cardinality problem for views which identify worlds with sets rather than pluralities.
Bohmian Collapse (forthcoming). In A. Bassi, S. Goldstein, R. Tumulka, and N. Zanghì, eds., Physics and the Nature of Reality: Essays in Memory of Detlef Dürr. Springer.
- I develop an account of how to compare the explanatory capacities of mathematical proofs.
Centering the Everett Interpretation (2022). Philosophical Quarterly 72: 1019-1039.
- I present, in accessible yet rigorous terms, the Bohmian account of collapse; I also discuss the account's virtues.
Intrinsicality and Entanglement (2022). Mind 131: 35-58.
- I propose an account of the Everett interpretation which, by invoking centered chances—objective chances, that is, of centered propositions—suggests that fundamental physical laws can include indexical information about us.
Pluralities, Counterparts, and Groups (2022). Philosophical Studies 179: 2133-2153.
- I show that when applied to entangled quantum systems, Langton and Lewis's analysis of intrinsicality faces a puzzle.
Tractability and Laws (2022). Synthese 200: 1-17.
- I propose and defend the view that groups are pluralities at times, and I compare that view to both (i) other views of groups in the literature, and (ii) analogous views of objects.
Typical: A Theory of Typicality and Typicality Explanation (2022). The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73: 561-581.
- I propose a best system account of laws in which calculational tractability, along with simplicity and strength, determines lawhood.
Centering the Principal Principle (2021). Philosophical Studies 178: 1897-1915.
- I argue that facts about what is typical—for instance, the fact that gases typically evolve to equilibrium—can explain.
- Featured in the OUP "Best of Philosophy 2019" article collection.
Comparing the Structures of Mathematical Objects (2021). Synthese 199: 6357-6369.
- I show that centered propositions pose a serious problem for Lewis's Principal Principle, and I solve the problem by proposing that centered propositions can be objectively chancy.
Explanatory Priority Monism (2021). Philosophical Studies 178: 1339-1359.
- I use automorphism groups to say what it takes for one mathematical object to have at least as much structure as another.
Grounding and Propositional Identity (2021). Analysis 81: 80-81.
- I argue that a single relation (i) backs all cases of explanation, and (ii) explains why other relations—causation, grounding, and so on—are explanation-backing.
The Counteridentical Account of Explanatory Identities (2021). The Journal of Philosophy 118: 57-78.
- I prove that standard conditions for grounding contradict standard conditions for the identities of propositions.
A Statistical Analysis of Luck (2020). Synthese 197: 867-885.
- I propose a theory of how identity facts explain by using (i) explanatory counterfactuals, (ii) counterpart theory, (iii) impossible worlds, and (iv) structural equation models.
An Argument for Entity Grounding (2020). Analysis 80: 500-507.
- I analyze luck using the Mentaculus, a statistical mechanical theory of probability.
Interventionist Explanation and the Problem of Single Variable Boundary Constraints (2020). Noûs 54: 945-955.
- I argue for the view that non-facts—as well as facts—can ground.
The Logic of Typicality (2020). In V. Allori, ed., Statistical Mechanics and Scientific Explanation: Determinism, Indeterminism and Laws of Nature. World Scientific (with Harry Crane).
- I use laws featuring just one variable to raise a problem—and suggest a solution—for interventionist accounts of explanation.
The Stage Theory of Groups (2020). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98: 661-674.
- I propose a formal system, based on propositional modal logic, for reasoning about typicality.
Celestial Chaos: The New Logics of Theory-Testing in Orbital Dynamics (2019). Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 65: 97-102.
- I propose an account of groups: roughly, groups are fusions of pluralities at worlds and times.
The Ontology of Mechanisms (2019). The Journal of Philosophy 116: 615-636.
- I argue that a new research methodology, currently emerging in the fields of astronomy and spacecraft trajectory design, solves several epistemological problems posed by chaotic dynamics in the solar system.
New Data on the Representation of Women in Philosophy Journals: 2004-2015 (2018). Philosophical Studies 175: 1441-1464 (with Sherri Conklin and Nicole Hassoun).
- I use causation to formulate existence conditions, identity conditions, and parthood conditions for mechanisms.
The Representation of Belief (2018). Journal of Philosophical Logic 47: 715-732.
- We present and analyze data on the percentage of women authors of articles in 25 top philosophy journals.
- I prove that if an agent's set of beliefs satisfies Scott's axiom, then that set of beliefs can be formally represented by a probability function.